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"Along with these three kinds of law goes a fourth, most impor-
tant of all, which is not graven on tablets of marble or brass, but on
the  hearts  of the  citizens.  This forms the  real constitution  of the
State  ..  ."  (Rousseau).
The drama  of the  moment is  impressive.  For only the  second
time  since  the  Constitution  was  written  and  adopted  in  1787-88,
citizens  of the United  States are  seriously  asking the most funda-
mental  questions  about it.  With  Watergate  and  impending  presi-
dential impeachment,  the country has been gripped  by the gravest
political crisis since the Civil War.  Often the President has proven
to  be  out of control.  The  threat  of a  dictatorial  government  has
loomed.  Unbridled  bureaucracies  have  acted  with  an  arrogance
befitting  their  autonomy.  Many  pressure  groups  have  exercised
enormous political leverage.  Increasingly  disorganized,  the public
has felt deceived  and disillusioned.  Politicians have  been reviled,
and politics  itself discredited.  The  heritage of Washington,  Jeffer-
son,  and  Lincoln-so long miraculously intact-has  seemed  to be
crumbling.
The mood of inquiry into constitutional reform must be solemn
and even  reverent.  We  are,  after all,  examining  the basic  arrange-
ments by  which  we  live  together  as human  beings.  At  the begin-
ning,  then,  the  undertaking  should  be  properly  understood.  To
quote Chief Justice John Marshall, "we must never forget that it is
a  constitution we  are  expounding"  (McCulloch  v.  Maryland,
1819).
Constitutional  government  means  limited  government.  It pro-
vides  a  framework  of power,  lays  out  a  system  of making  and
enforcing laws, and-most important of all-prescribes limits,  em-
bodied with us in the Bill of Rights, that the government-of-the-day
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91cannot  change.  The  ideal  and  the  reality  of limited  government
form  the  most precious  secular heritage  of humanity:  the proof of
that  statement  resides  in  the  bloody  annals  of tyranny.  The  ulti-
mate  alternatives to limited government are  Dachau  and the Gulag
Archipelago.  Far  from  calling  the  essentials  of constitutionalism
into  question,  we  must  be  concerned  with  nourishing  and
strengthening  constitutional  government.  Our  discussion  will  be
limited to the powers of the  President:  the powers of Congress;  the
manner of election  of the President  and of Congress;  the relation-
ships between  President and Congress-and between both and the
people; and the  strengthening of political  parties.  As in the present
Constitution,  the  intention  is  to check power with  power.  Instead
of  pitting  the  President  against  Congress,  we  suggest  that  the
power  of  the  government-of-the-day  may  more  effectively  be
checked  by  an  organized  opposition  headed  by  a  "shadow  gov-
ernment."  Both  government  and  opposition  would  be  institu-
tionalized  in  strong,  disciplined,  and  centralized  political  parties.
Many  people  have  felt the  need  for fundamental  changes.  Re-
cent  Presidents-Eisenhower,  Kennedy,  and  Lyndon  B.  John-
son-have  considered  and  some  have  urged  basic  constitutional
reforms.  In  1973,  Richard  M.  Nixon  endorsed  a  single  six-
year  term  for  Presidents  coupled  with  a  four-year  term  for Con-
gressmen.  Ironically,  his suggestion  coincided  with  the  most  seri-
ous discussion of presidential  impeachment  since the impeachment
and  trial  of President  Andrew  Johnson  in  1868.  The  thought  of
impeachment  made many persons  shudder.  And  yet there was the
haunting nightmare  of a discredited  President continuing  in office
for forty  months.  Senator Edward  M.  Kennedy  and  commentator
Howard  K.  Smith,  among  others,  pointed  out that  the  parliamen-
tary  system  would enable  removal  of a  politically  disabled  Presi-
dent  by  political  means  and  for  political  reasons-a  great  im-
provement  over impeachment.
In  this situation,  two facts  were  of first  importance.  First,  the
crisis of 1973  had been foreshadowed.  Presidential  abuse of power,
though  recently  much  worse,  had  been  visible  for  decades;  the
inadequacy  of Congress  to  provide  an  alternative  to  presidential
government  had been  shown from the close of the Civil War to the
end  of the  nineteenth  century  and  fitfully  demonstrated  again
thereafter;  and the malaise  of public  opinion,  becoming evident in
the late  1960's,  seemed to be deepening  in the  1970's.  In short, the
problems  were  long-standing  and  were  rooted  in structural  faults;
they  were not associated with one administration  and one series of
events.  Second,  there was-there is-a way out,  painful,  difficult,
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surgery approaching the severity of that of 1787.  The end result can
be  briefly  stated  as  "presidential  leadership  and  party  govern-
ment."
It will be useful to set forth the diagnosis and the prescription in
an outline:
1.  A  foremost  requirement  of  a  great  power  like  the  United
States  is  strong executive leadership.  The  political demand  for it,
manifestly worldwide,  arises from the present condition of interna-
tional relationships,  given  the  state  of the military  arts;  from the
unavoidable  need  to develop  and  use science  to maintain  national
security;  from  the  economic  imperatives  in  a  country  in  an  ad-
vanced state of industrialization  (to maintain economic  stability, to
keep  unemployment  low,  and  to control  inflation);  and  from  the
need  to reconcile  the continuation  of economic growth  with rising
demands for protection of the environment.
2.  America met the first requirement by  its  presidency;  but  in
recent decades,  the presidency  has escaped  the  political  controls
essential to constitutional,  that  is, limited, government.  New con-
trols must  be found.
3.  The  search  for  controls  is  complicated  by  the  danger  that
curbs may diminish the effectiveness  of the presidency. The execu-
tive  needs  energy  today  at  least  as  much  as  in  the  critical  years
immediately  following  1787  when the framers  of the Constitution
concluded  that  it  should  be  wielded  by  a  single  pair of hands  to
achieve  the  "decision,  activity,  secrecy  [yes,  secret!]  and  dis-
patch"  essential  to  safeguarding  the  republic  (Alexander  Hamil-
ton in Federalist  No. 70).  How to maintain the full force and effect
of the presidency and yet to restrain those presidential excesses  so
generously demonstrated  in  this century?
4.  The beginning of the answer lies in the relationship  between
the President  and the  people.  The major premise  of our theory of
representation  has been: the people must rule. But the people can-
not  rule  and  the  President  has  become  their substitute.  Accord-
ingly, he personifies their political authority. When he speaks from
atop his pyramid of 40 million votes, with  the bulk of the populace
reportedly  behind  him,  he  is  awe  inspiring.  His infallibility  espe-
cially  impresses those closest  to him whose  approval,  if not their
adulation, convinces  him that he is larger than life.  And yet all this
authority may dissolve if the public turns against him. The people's
choice  becomes  the  people's  curse.  We have  seen  it happen  five
times  in this century.  President Nixon's plunge  by mid-1973  from
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edly  swift; but  witness the  debacles  of Woodrow  Wilson,  Herbert
Hoover,  Harry  Truman,  and  Lyndon Johnson.  The forced  reten-
tion  of a  President  whose  prestige  has  been  shattered  is  always
dangerous  and can  be disastrous for the country.
5.  A measure of control over the President can be provided by
subjecting  him to the criticism of an organized,  focused opposition
with  leadership  centered  in  one  person  who  will  be  continuously
visible  and  vocal as  the  alternative  to the President.  As  the presi-
dency  is unified,  so should the opposition  be unified.  As the  Presi-
dent  speaks  with  a  single  voice,  so  should  he  be  answered  by  a
single  voice  instead of by  a clamor of discordant  and little  known
voices in a legislative body whose genius has been the dispersion of
power.  If a focused  opposition can be achieved,  the perception  by
the  public  of  the  opposition  (and  especially  of  its  leader)  will
change-and  this will change  the  crucial  relationship between  the
public and  its government.
6.  To  establish  an  opposition  we  must  turn  to  Congress,  and
the first step is to contradict the myth that greater controls over the
President  without unduly undermining  his  power can  be provided
merely  by  increasing  the  weight of Congress.  When  powers  are
separated,  they  are  ordinarily  less  shared  than  displaced.  Either
power resides in  the presidency  with  some  congressional  criticism
and  subject  to  some  bargaining,  or  it  shifts  to  the  bureaucracy,
defined  as conglomerates of power among agencies,  strategic Con-
gressmen,  and  interest  groups.  It  must  be  understood  that  the
genius of Congress  is opposite to that of the presidency.  Where the
presidency  comes  to  life  in  the  unification  of  power,  Congress
disperses power among the hundred leaders each with his own base
in  seniority  and  in  sectional jurisdiction  (over  taxation,  finance,
transportation,  military,  labor,  the judiciary,  or whatever).  It  has
been  impossible  to  create  in  Congress  a  concentration  of power
sufficient  to furnish  an organized  opposition to the  President-let
alone  to  provide  a centralized  executive  government.
True  enough,  stung by  President Nixon's  charges  that  "delay
in congressional  consideration  of the budget  is a major problem,"
that the  budget  is  "fragmented,"  that  it lends  itself to  "backdoor
financing,"  and that congressional committees  were  unduly "sym-
pathetic  to  particular  and  narrow  causes"-and  driven,  too,  by
their fear that by impounding funds the President would  seize con-
trol  of  spending-congressional  leaders  embarked  on  a  major
budgetary  reform  in  1973-74.  Only time  will tell if the reform will
bring about a significant change or whether the historic tendency  in
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in  a new guise.
Congress  was  unable  to  invent,  adopt,  and maintain  an  effec-
tive and responsible system for controlling government spending in
the nineteenth century,  particularly  in  the  second half.  Provisions
for the executive budget in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
clearly followed from-if they were not dictated by-congressional
inability  to  organize  its own controls  of spending.  Since  then  two
more  efforts  by Congress  to reform  its budgetary  proceedings,  in
1946  and in  1950,  have ended  in failure.
7.  The nature of Congress is strongly influenced by the manner
of its selection-staggered  terms for Senators,  two-year  terms for
Representatives.  As  with  the  President,  this  situation  induces  a
peculiar relationship  between  Congress and the public.  Where  the
President  is  elected  as  one  without  equal,  Congressmen  and
Senators  tend  to  be  chosen  as  a  means  of  assuring  their  con-
stituents'  shares of the national largesse.  The voter's  political ob-
ligation  in  electing  Congressmen  is  held  to  be  fulfilled  when  he
communicates  his wants to government. The voter has no share in
the responsibility of government.  Indeed, the "responsible  elector-
ate"  has  been  authoritatively defined  as  one that knows on which
side its bread is buttered. The logical outcome for public opinion  is
that Congress  "as  a whole"  is despised because Congressmen are
generally  seen  as  serving  the  interests  of others-but  individual
Congressmen  are  typically admired  and  appreciated  by the active
and knowledgeable  among their constituents.
8.  The first reform then must strike at the relationships not only
between  President  and  Congress  but  also between  both  and  the
public.  The  President  and  Congress  should  be  elected  for simul-
taneous four-year terms. In addition, the defeated candidate for the
presidency  should  have  a  seat in  the  House  of Representatives,
priority  in  committees  and  on  the  floor,  and  a  staff,  offices,  and
other perquisites suitable to his position as the leader of the opposi-
tion.
The same  imperatives  that practically  dictate concentrated  ex-
ecutive  leadership  in  modern  industrial nations  call  as  well  for  a
unified opposition.  If we  can create conditions that will encourage
the rise  of a  single  leader of the opposition,  we  can  count on the
compulsions of the times-greatly assisted by the alert members of
the press-to confirm  his claims to  the reins of alternative author-
ity. Moreover,  the press will certify his title to the public at large so
that his legitimacy becomes  "graven on the hearts of the citizens"
as part of the "real  constitution of the  state."
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leader that they can no  longer follow him? Let the members  of his
party in Congress remove him.  But require them to do so by an act
that  names  his  successor.  In  one  stroke,  then,  the  opposition
should become  visible,  unified,  stable,  responsible,  and legitimate.
There  is  a  similarity  here  to  the  great  improvement  of the  West
German  Constitution  of 1949 over the Weimar  Constitution.  The
bundestag may express its lack of confidence  in the Federal  Chan-
cellor (and  thus  expel  him  from  office)  but only  by a  vote  which
names  his  successor.
9.  How  would  presidential  candidates  be  nominated?  Let the
candidates  for  Congress  of each  party  constitute  the  party's  na-
tional  nominating  convention  so  that  when  people  vote  for  and
share  in the nominations of Congressmen, they will know that they
are also naming those who  will nominate  candidates for President.
10.  Other  reforms  include:  Abolish  the  office  of  Vice-
President.  It would  no longer be needed  since under party govern-
ment a means for immediately filling a vacancy  in the presidency  is
at  hand.  Reduce  the  role  of the  Senate  and  enlarge  that  of the
House of Representatives  because  a  system that  makes  the  chief
executive accountable to the legislature  is very hard to work if two
"co-equal"  legislative  bodies  are functioning.  Introduce  a gener-
ous  slate of congressional  candidates-at-large,  to  supplement  the
Congressmen from single-member districts.  Provide that the party
winning  the  presidency  will  elect  enough  of  its  slate  of
Congressmen-at-large  to  insure  that  it  has  a  working  majority  in
Congress and thus put an end to divided government.  Create con-
ditions which will invite  the use of the power of dissolution  so that
it becomes  the normal way of ending one government and creating
its  successor.
11.  These  changes  should give  the voters  a new  sense of their
function and of their relationship to government.  They will be able
to realize  a political  responsibility  which  the present  Constitution
denies  them  or,  at  least,  makes  very  obscure,  namely,  that  they
share  in the  selection of a government-or,  equally  important,  of
an  opposition.  This  action  is  significant.  First,  it  will  cause  a
wholesome  change  in  a  basic  premise  of  American  political
thought.  Implicit in the new electoral  system is the realization that
government is  a necessity  if people  are  to dwell  in  communities.
Second,  these  changes  will  give  voters  the  experience  which
will give  rise to an improved theory of representation.  The people
will  elect  a  government-and  an  opposition-and  hold  them  ac-
countable,  the  one  for  governing,  the  other  for  systematically
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of representative  democracy  should  emerge.
Third,  an  extremely  significant  step  will  be  taken  to  restore
political controls on the President without diminishing his essential
power.  He would be seen as the necessary and legitimate leader for
a given  period  rather than as the  personification  of the  will of the
people which  has been called  "the  voice of God."  Governmental
decisions would rest on a majority,  a sufficiently  legitimizing con-
cept, but one which takes into account the fact that nearly half the
people  consider  the  President  to  be  politically  fallible-and  one
which  will prevail  merely for the good and democratic reason that
in  a civilized community  there  must be  some  way other than vio-
lence  to  settle  disputes.  Control over the  President  derived  from
these  propositions  will be enhanced  by the presence  of the leader
of the opposition  and the alternative government which  he  heads.
The tendency for the instincts, the whims,  or the idiosyncrasies of
Presidents to become expressed  in  dangerous initiatives  should be
greatly reduced.
Fourth, the sovereign right of the majority to choose  a govern-
ment which  it considers  more favorable  to  its interests  would not
be denied; but the emphasis would be placed-where  it should be if
the public  is  to have  a  practicable  and  active  share  in  the  awful
responsibility  of modern government-on  the choice of who shall
rule.
12.  The new framework of government  will increase the ability
of politicians  to bring bureaucracy  in  America under control.  And
the  balance  of  power  between  public  government  and  private
groups,  which  is  unfortunately  tipped  toward  the  latter  in  tradi-
tional American  politics,  will  be redressed.
13.  Beyond  these  considerations  looms  the  inability  of  the
American  system  to  replace  a  President  who  has become  politi-
cally discredited.  Impeachment is a clumsy device.  Indeed,  it is all
but  unworkable.
In  my  remarks  so  far,  criticism  of impeachment  is  relatively
minor among the indictments  of the American  system.  Neverthe-
less,  some  may  argue  that the accuracy  of the description  of im-
peachment  as "all  but unworkable"  is denied by the fact that "the
system  worked"  in  1974.  It  seems  wise,  therefore,  to  supply  a
rebuttal,  as follows:
Impeachment  was  unconscionably  long  in working.  The delay
was  extremely expensive  because  of the  diversion  of the govern-
ment from the deepening economic crises that plagued the country.
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institutions  generally  and  for the  Republican  party  in  particular.
When the  system  finally worked  it did so  under such  unusual  cir-
cumstances  that the result must be  considered largely  a matter of
luck.
President  Nixon  resigned  August  8,  1974.  Until  August  5  he
was  reported  to  have  considerable  support  in  the Senate  if a trial
should be forced there by an impeachment  vote in the House. Then
came  disclosure of the tape recording of Mr.  Nixon's conversation
with Mr.  Haldeman,  June 23,  1972.  All ten of Mr.  Nixon's staunch
supporters  on  the  House  Judiciary  Committee  immediately
switched  sides.  They jointly declared  that  it  "was Richard  Nixon
. . . who  impeded  the  investigation  of the Watergate  affairs  [and
who]  preserved  the damning evidence  . . . and  . . . concealed  its
terrible  import until  he could do so no longer."  Support crumbled
among  30 to  40 Senators  deemed  most  likely to  uphold  the Presi-
dent (34  sufficing  for acquittal).  Various  persons  managed  to con-
vey  the  dimensions  of the  debacle  to  Mr.  Nixon,  who  stepped
aside August  8  so that Gerald  R.  Ford  could become  President.
Along  with  the  sigh  of relief that  swept  the  country  came  a
chorus of familiar voices celebrating the toughness,  adequacy, and
resilience  of the nation's  political  institutions.  Praise was  heaped
on the  Supreme Court's unanimous decision (absent Justice Rehn-
quist)  requiring  Mr.  Nixon to release the subpoenaed  tape record-
ings.  Accolades  were  showered  on Congress  for its cautious  and
sober approach  to impeachment.  There was acclaim for the smooth
transfer  of power  to  President  Ford  and  his  acceptance  by  the
public despite the fact that he was the first incumbent who had not
been popularly elected.  (The public's  euphoria may have been dis-
turbed by Mr. Ford's full pardon of Mr. Nixon September 8,  1974.)
Nevertheless,  some  observers  remain  critical.  They  stress the
virtually  unique events surrounding the resignation.  An avalanche
of impeachment  evidence  was launched  by one  bungled burglary,
the  perpetrators  of which  might  well  have  gone  undiscovered.
Much  more  important,  Mr.  Nixon's  contention  that  he could  be
impeached only if proven guilty by legally admissible evidence of a
criminal  act-that he  must be  "caught  with  a  smoking gun  in  his
hand"-would  very  likely  have  prevailed  over  the  counterargu-
ment that impeachment required  proof merely of a political offense
that  need not be a crime  at  common  law.  Had Mr.  Nixon's argu-
ment prevailed, it would  probably have  vindicated  him but for the
emergence of such evidence  as that contained  in the fatal recording
of June  23,  1972.  Surely  no  future  President  will  be  so  accom-
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of all  secret recording equipment  in  the White  House.  The lesson
seems  clear:  the  investigation  of Watergate  and  the  formal  im-
peachment  process  consumed  18  months,  absorbed  much  of the
government's  attention  during  a  time  of  aggravating  foreign  and
domestic crises,  significantly increased public disillusionment with
our  political  institutions,  and-in  the end-succeeded  largely be-
cause  of fortuitous circumstances.
The  fault  of impeachment  for  removing  Presidents  lies  in  its
legalistic  procedures,  that smell  of the criminal  courts,  its indict-
ments  and its trial according to the rules of evidence,  to ascertain
the  individual's guilt  or  innocence.  But  emphasis  on  the  legal
liability of individuals hides political responsibility  which  must be
collective.
In the modern age,  the intricate  and complex problems of gov-
ernment require  a collegial approach  (as current political terminol-
ogy  recognizes-the  White  House  team,  the task forces,  the  Na-
tional  Security  Council,  the  Domestic  Council,  the  presidential
game  plan).  Political  adequacy  is judged,  not  by  weighing  indi-
vidual  guilt or innocence  according  to the  rules  of evidence,  but
rather by  political  procedures  for  testing  confidence  in  the  pru-
dence  and judgment of government.  Legal  guilt  by association  is
unacceptable;  political  liability  by  association  is  essential.  The
political  process  should  be  capable  of  registering  the  collective
judgment  of responsible  politicians-who,  in turn, are  informed by
their  sense  of public  opinion-on  the  prudence  and  wisdom  of
governments.  The legality of a President's  acts may figure  in such
judgments  but  more  important  are  decisions  on  presidential  pru-
dence,  grasp of events,  will,  wisdom,  and  self-control.
It was impeachment  on such grounds,  namely, to enforce polit-
ical  responsibility,  that  James  Madison  apparently  had  in  mind
when  he successfully  urged the first  session of the First Congress
under the  Constitution  (1789)  to  acknowledge  that  the  President
must have the power not only to appoint but also to remove subor-
dinate officers.
The system of government proposed  in this essay would aim at
restoring  Madison's priceless  sense of political responsibility,  and
it  would  do so  without  clinging  to the  misplaced  legalisms  of im-
peachment,  including  the  extraordinary  two-thirds  majority  re-
quired for conviction.  Under this system, the question of President
Nixon's  continuation  in  office  should  have  been  decided  in  the
summer of 1973.  If he had been replaced,  it would have been  by a
man acceptable to  the Republicans  (who would  have had a major-
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lem  should  have  been  solved  and  put  behind  us.  It  is a  shocking
thing for Americans to contemplate  the removal of the chief execu-
tive.  It will not be done lightly.  For a majority party to remove its
own  leader  means  to  destroy  its  most  valuable  political  property
and to increase the risks of every  party member.  There  are  times,
nevertheless,  when  it  must  be  seriously  considered  and  perhaps
done.
14.  As the  idea that a President can be replaced by an adverse
vote of confidence  becomes fixed  in the living Constitution-or as
presidential  resignation  comes  to  be  understood  and  accepted
when  he  loses  so  many  supporters  that he  is  prompted  to  resign
even without an adverse  vote  of confidence-another  step  should
be taken. Along with the establishment of executive accountability
to  the  legislature,  enforced  by votes  of confidence  requiring  ma-
jorities to sustain the executive, there should be an executive coun-
terthrust, the ability of the executive to dissolve the legislature  and
to  call  for  new  elections  so  that  the  people  may  again  choose  a
government and  an opposition.
In the  first  place,  the power  to dissolve  is  of essential  impor-
tance  in  the  creation  of cohesive  and  disciplined  parties.  In  the
second  place,  once this  step is  taken,  we  may devoutly  hope that
dissolution  will  become  the  normal  way  governments  are  ended
and  new  governments  chosen.  When  that  happens,  our  endless
nominating and electoral campaigns  will be compressed  into a few
weeks.  It will  remove  the hazards  inherent  in  calendar elections
that now permit potential enemies to plan to harass this country at
a time of great vulnerability:  during the period when elections must
be held.  The cost of campaigns  and the leverage  of money in  poli-
tics  will  be  reduced.  Stringent  campaign  laws  will  then  become
much  more enforceable.
15.  And,  finally,  party  government  and  short  electoral  cam-
paigns  will  enable  us  to  smother  the  viper  of  corruption.  John
Gardner,  in  a  New  York  Times  article,  "You  Are  Being Had,"
said that in  the United  States,  "elective  offices  can be purchased;
. . .votes  of Federal,  state  and local officials  are bought and sold
every day;  . . . access  of the people to their government is blocked
by a  Chinese  Wall of money."  The  daily  harvest  of news  brings
dreary  confirmation.  There  was  a  time  when  similar  corruption
flourished in Britain.  But it came  to an end with the emergence  of
party government.
In conclusion,  it is  well  to examine  certain counterarguments.
One  is offered  by Samuel  H.  Beer in  "Government  and  Politics:
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argues that "some grand program of party reform to create respon-
sible and cohesive  partisan majorities in Congress and in the coun-
try  ...  may have  vast effects"  which,  from the tone of the indict-
ment,  will  be  at  least  unfortunate  and  perhaps  disastrous.  Until
these evil consequences  are specified we must dismiss them. Many
of the  framers  of the Constitution  of 1787  had  doubts  about the
enterprise.  As late as  1802,  Alexander  Hamilton wrote:  "Perhaps
no  man  in  the  United  States has  sacrificed  or done  more  for the
present Constitution  than myself;  and contrary to  my anticipation
of its fate,  . . . I  am still  laboring to  prop the frail  and  worthless
fabric."  Nevertheless,  our  Constitution  served  well  for  perhaps
160 years.  Now there is an argument for fundamentally  revising it.
That argument can no more be answered than could the advocates
of the  1787 Constitution by picturing desperate  but undefined ills if
the path of revision  is pursued.
More  concretely,  the  counterargument  asserts  that  political
parties,  rather  than becoming  more cohesive  as they must  if they
are to be instruments of party government,  are losing their appeal.
Party  ties  are  weakening;  party  loyalty  is  declining.  Indeed,  the
argument  holds  that American  parties will  become  more  effective
instruments  of social  choice  only  if and  when  millions  of people
have grasped a new  vision of the national future which they  need a
political  party  to carry out.
At  present,  our governmental  arrangements  (divided  govern-
ments,  separated  constituencies,  staggered  elections,  etc.)  are ex-
quisitely  designed to  accelerate  the disintegration  of political par-
ties.  We  are  proposing reforms to  simplify politics,  to identify the
roles of voters and of candidates for office  and of elected officials,
and  to  clarify  lines  of accountability  and  responsibility.  If these
reforms  are  adopted  and  the  new  institutions  come  into  being,
citizens will soon feel that they share in the crucial task of govern-
ment  through  an  act  of unique  significance  that  only  they  can
perform-voting  in  an  election  that  clearly  creates  a  government
and  an opposition.  If this  comes  about,  the  proper aspirations  of
the  advocates  of  participatory  democracy  will  be  significantly
fulfilled.  We cannot know before the fact if a new set of institutions
will  nourish  parties  capable  of governing  as  parties,  but there  is
some  evidence that party government may be feasible in America.
A  final counterargument  is  that  major reforms  are not needed;
rather,  reform  of Congress  will  suffice-and  Congress  seems on
the  verge  of the  most  sweeping  reforms  in  its  history.  The  War
Powers  Act  of  1973  was  passed  over  a  presidential  veto.  The
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theory.  An  extensive  examination  of the committee  structure  has
been  undertaken  in  the  House.  A  significant  bill to  reform  cam-
paign  finances  has  passed the  Senate.  Perhaps  most important  of
all,  fundamental  changes  in  the fiscal  functions  of Congress-the
whole  business  of taxing  and  spending-have  been  legislated.
Some  of the reforms  remain  to be  fully  realized  and others (espe-
cially the War  Powers Act)  are  still to be tested.  Will  the reforms
work?  Asking whether the new Budget Committees  will be able to
make  authoritative  decisions,  Professor  Beer concedes  that  such
an outcome  "surely will require rather more hierarchy in the inner
structure  of Congress  than exists now."
At first the counterarguments  may  seem persuasive.  If we can
solve  our  problems  by  passing  laws  rather than  having  to  amend
the Constitution,  it will be simpler,  easier, and more prudent to do
so.  And yet history has  a warning for us.  For Congress to achieve
"rather more hierarchy"  means that Congress  must become  more
centralized-in  short,  more  like  the  executive.  But  that  will  go
against  the  nature  of Congress  which  has been  to  divide  and  to
distribute  power  rather  than  to  centralize  it.  During  periods  of
congressional  supremacy,  fiscal  policy-taxing and spending-has
been a shambles.  When Congress has failed in the past, the cry has
gone  up  to  give  more  power  to  the  President.  Will  the  price  of
present complaisance,  of assurance that we can get by if we merely
reform present procedures,  be a clamor five or ten years from now
for enormous  grants of power to  the  President?
Let us listen to those  who advocate  reform by relatively  minor
adjustments  within  the  present  system.  At  the  same  time  let  us
insist  on  keeping  the  study  and  the  discussion  of basic  constitu-
tional  reform alive  and  vigorous.  If the momentum  for change  of
this magnitude becomes  irresistible  in the United States-as it has
fairly  recently  in  every  other  constitutional  democracy-we  had
best be prepared.
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